**(written twenty years ago)**

As Einstein vehemently maintained, it is the very nature of light (now most completely described by quantum theories) that is at the heart of the formalism of SR. But now Quantum Electrodynamics encompasses the explanation of electron energy exchanges and has, therefore, supplanted classical electrodynamics which was developed by Maxwell for the detailed explanation of related phenomena. In Lorentz’s mathematical precursor of SR the derivation was based on an electron theory which forced equations of electrodynamics to be invariant under uniform relative motions (in his case with respect to an ether). Einstein also demonstrated the invariance of Maxwell’s equations with respect to a Lorentz transformation as signally significant. One should certainly have expected two thus intricately related theories for which a complimentary symmetry could be established between scientific domains, to have exhibited complimentary formalisms. Far from being the case, however, SR is based exclusively on a simple set of algebraic equations relating classical parameters in the state vector of an observed object (or event on the object) to that what would be observed by another in a simple one-to-one mapping assuming deterministic projection. QM on the other hand is embodied in Schrödinger’s complex differential operator equation (or equivalently in Heisenberg’s matrix mechanics) for which solutions have no direct classical analog. Their only consistent meaning involves interpretation of a product of the solution with its complex conjugate to form a probability density function from which ‘expected’ classical parameter values for the observable state vector can be calculated. These differences are somewhat understandable since SR provides the analogy of coordinate conversion and Schrödinger’s approach is more directly analogous to electromagnetic field equations, but SR was validated with respect to those classical equations which Schrödinger replaced. However, the basic postulate of SR is that all of the fundamental laws of physics must be invariant under Lorentz transformations and this most basic equation of QM isn’t – although a Klein-Gordon version does provide that nominal covariance. Furthermore, the assumption of a deterministic projection as assumed by SR is inherently incompatible with indeterminism as demanded by QM.

Thus, the formalisms and methodologies of the two theories have been totally unique from inception onward. Both of the theories are considered to be firmly based on confirmed observations, but they embrace different conceptions of what even constitutes an observer or an observation. SR credulously embraces a sentient framework endowed with capabilities to assess space and time values for any event occurring within a space/time cone encompassing all past and future events of the entire universe that can in any way be causally related within the particular reference frame. QM, on the other hand, addresses observation with extreme suspicion; it assumes the very act of observation to be no less significant in many cases than the action that is being observed, and in general to be associated with an uncertainty in determination of the objects of observation. SR employs extreme realism to the extent that ‘real’ contraction is assumed even after its having been shown by Penrose and others that such contractions *cannot* be observed. (Actually, a second transformation is required in determining contemporaneous observations whose results can be considered on a par with what are called ‘observables’ in QM. Lorentz transformations provide four-dimensional correspondences with what are noncontemporaneous events on a rigid structure in the ‘other’ frame assuming observations equivalent to what would be the case if light sources were stationary with respect to the observer.) Correspondence requires a further transformation of the ‘field of vision’ to obtain the contemporaneous ‘visual’ observation prediction for another observer. Thus Einstein’s interpretation of the results of the Lorentz transformations (invoking a unique space/time metric) presupposes the existence of an intermediate level of reality beneath (*visual*) observation with related confusing terminologies involving ‘actual’ and ‘observed’ as essential to an interpretation of experiments. QM, on the other hand, has been interpreted almost exclusively over the last three quarters of a century according to a Copenhagen Interpretation embracing a most extreme form of positivism, sometimes called ‘logical empiricism,’ that denies that there can even be meaning to concepts for which direct observation cannot be obtained. Thus, QM requires a direct correlation with ‘observation’ in a sense other than could be supported by any of the currently accepted interpretations of an ‘observation’ in relativity. Furthermore, alternative observations by separate (or even the same) observers of an event on an object in QM can only be statistically correlated since each observation involves its own inherently unique state variations. SR assumes inherently unique coordinate realities for relatively moving coincident observers, but the vehicle of observation (a ‘ray’ of light) is according to Einstein’s interpretation shared by the two observers to accommodate the precise anticipation of an observation by third parties using a velocity addition formula. The essential philosophical differences of these theories, therefore, result in each entirely refuting the validity of the approach taken by the other.

If the geological theory of plate tectonics were to be applied by analogy to stresses accumulating between adjacent domains within our scientific ‘World View,’ it would surely indicate that we are overdue for seismic activity along this fault line. Or as Kuhn would say, “In fact, however, step by step their deep divergences and incoherencies emerge increasingly within the scientific community, but people do not see them until finally the confusion becomes so great that the situation breaks down.”

It is inevitable that physical theories should be continually replaced, but a completely smooth evolution of their domains does not occur. This is partly, of course, because of incommensurabilities that Khun has identified with alternative theoretical paradigms that are as inevitable as change itself, but in addition, human loyalty tends to weigh more heavily than objective thinking or the surpassing value of sincerity ought to accommodate. In deference to William of Occam it should be acknowledged that it is much simpler not to rock a floating boat to obtain a marginally better oarsman and, therefore, to be replaced, a theory must offend much more than *mere* philosophy. But, inevitably, change *does *occur. There are many reasons why theories are ultimately replaced – why alternative, even though mathematically equivalent, interpretations *must* be changed. Experimental data may accumulate which cannot (or which can only awkwardly) be accounted by the original theory. Analogies of terminology may become so completely absurd that previously unquestioned relationships must either now be demonstrated to be independent of the analogy or withdrawn. More comprehensive formalization accommodates a merger of theoretical treatments of various theories that were formerly appropriate but only within a more restricted scientific domain. Finally, it seems altogether fitting that as (and if) the philosophy of science matures, the credibility of older, philosophically unsound, theories may completely erode, even if only gradually, until they are completely undermined.

All these factors favoring change are present in varying degrees in the current situation; it seems to the author that they are more especially damaging to SR than to QM as currently interpreted by Cramer, although this is not the conventional wisdom. At any rate, there have been considerably more revolutionary developments since SR was originally conceived than is the case for QM, even if the years to have transpired are only so slightly greater.

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